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Abstract What can be learned from data about human survival at extreme age? In
this rejoinder we give our views on some of the issues raised in the discussion of our
paper Rootze´n and Zholud (Extremes 20(4), 713–728, 2017).
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Introduction We thank the discussants1 for very stimulating, thought-provoking,
and educational comments. We were impressed by the title of Davison’s contribution,
1Davison (2018), Ferreira and Huang (2018), Keiding (2018), Nerman (2018), Segers (2018), Stoev and
Battacharya (2018), and Zhou (2018). John Einmahl, Jutta Gampe, and Jan Vijg were also invited to
participate in the discussion.
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and by the precise prediction in the bible cited by Stoev & Battacharya, and by their
attempt to “play God’s advocate”.
Biology, accident deaths, compression of morbidity Nerman gives a quick and
useful pointer to the very large literature on biological theories of aging, and writes
that the question of a limit for human lifespans is not primarily statistical, but bio-
logical. We agree with this, but also think that one should use available data as
efficiently as possible to give an empirical underpinning of biological theories—and
also because of the intrinsic interest of the problem.
In their impressive contribution—a full paper on its own—Stoev & Battacharya
make the intriguing comment that not knowing the cause of death may lead to bias.
E.g., if the roof of the home of a supercentenarian falls down and kills all of the
inhabitants, the observed supercentenarian life length should perhaps be considered
as censored rather than fully observed. In a less dramatic, and often occurring event,
if a supercentenarian has a fall which shortens her life length, should this be taken
into account in the analysis? It could perhaps have been avoided by changing the
layout of the home. But on the other hand the fall is usually also an effect of the
frailty of the supercentenarian. Should the answer to the question about a biological
limit for the human lifespan aim at describing life lengths of humans living in a
“test tube” were no falls are possible and where they will not die from infectious
diseases? But, could any human live like this? In the end, perhaps the most interesting
approach is still to study lifespans as they are observed under the biological and
cultural circumstances which the supercentenarians have lived under. However, if
one takes cause of death into account in a statistical analysis this would amount to
changing some observations from truncated to truncated and censored, and would
lead to a longer estimated lifespan.
We agree with the hope expressed by Stoev & Battacharya that extreme value
statistics could contribute to the quite difficult statistical analysis surrounding the
question whether we will “age healthy” or “age sick”. This discussion was started
by the “compression of morbidity” hypothesis of Fries (1980). His arguments build
on an assumed finite limit for the human lifespan, but an unbounded lifespan is also
compatible with both compression and expansion of morbidity. Fries inferred a finite
limit of life lengths from an ideal “rectangularization” of survival curves, from a
projected upper limit of 85 years for life expectancy, to be achieved in 2045, and from
the fact that at the time when his paper was written the largest known human lifespan
was 114 years. However, the ideal rectangular shape of the survival curve in Fig. 1
in his paper is contradicted by the very dramatic increase in survival up to age 100;
see Vaupel (2010). Further, in 2015 the expected life length for women in Japan was
86.8 year, well above the Fries limit; finally the IDL data base contains 10 humans
validated at level A and living longer than 115 years and the version of the GRG data
base used in our paper contains an additional 14, with several added later.
Practical extreme value statistics To address comments by Nerman, Segers, Stoev
& Batacharya, and Zhou: The goals of an extreme value statistics analysis more often
than not are both to increase the understanding of the extreme events, say extreme
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life lengths, and to extrapolate the distribution of event sizes a bit outside the range of
observations— but never to extrapolate all the way to infinity. Our practical approach
to this is to find the simplest possible model for the extreme observations at hand,
and then use it for understanding and extrapolation.
Occam’s razor is the classical expression of “simple”, and “simple” is also
expressed in Einstein’s adage “Raffiniert ist der Herrgott, aber boshaft ist er nicht”.
This is the hope that in the absence of information to the contrary simple models are
those which describe our world most usefully. Simple models increase understand-
ing: One learns from the ways data agree with or deviate from the simple model, and
learning increases if different researchers start by trying the same simple model, as
opposed to when everyone uses a different complicated model.
“Simple” means different things in different contexts. For excesses of high thresh-
olds, the simplest model is that they follow an exponential distribution: then excesses
of even higher threshold have the same exponential distribution, and the exponential
distribution (of course, and for many parent distributions) occurs as the limiting dis-
tribution of scale normalized excesses. Assuming an exponential distribution is the
default in statistical reliability theory. The second simplest one is the family of gen-
eralized Pareto (GP) distributions. For GP distributed excesses, excesses of a higher
threshold also follow a scale changed version of the same GP distribution, and the GP
distributions is the family of distributions which can be obtained as limits of distri-
butions of threshold excesses. These characterizations are completely parallel to the
properties of the normal distribution which make it the simplest distribution in non-
extreme statistics. The next level of generality could then be to include covariates in
the parameters, or to use second order regular variation to construct a more general
family of distributions, or . . . .
For the IDL supercentenarian data the simplest model is an exponential distribu-
tion for excess ages, without any influence of the covariates sex, time, or group of
countries, as checked by embedding it in the family of generalized Pareto distribu-
tions and by testing for non-exponentiality and for inclusion of covariates. A further
crucial confirmation of the simple model is given by the nonparametic analysis in
Gampe (2010). Themodel that survival after age 110 is exponential thus constitutes what
we can learn from existing data, and what can be used for extrapolation. As always
extrapolation beyond the range of data comes with caveats, as discussed below.
Nerman does not see any convincing reason to restrict analysis of excess life length
data by assuming that they follow a generalized Pareto distribution, and is not con-
vinced by the extrapolation to the age range 120–130 years. Above we have set out
our reasons for disagreeing with Nerman’s first point. But we think Nerman is right
in his comment about extrapolation: Data convincingly shows an exponential distri-
bution of survival for ages 110–115 and indicate that for ages 116–122 survival is
also exponential. For ages 123–130 there is no data, and reality could turn out to be
different. Extrapolation to these ages is still useful, we believe, because of its intrin-
sic interest, and because it makes it possible to detect interesting changes in survival
as quickly as possible. And then, to extrapolate one should use the simplest model.
In contrast to Nerman, Stoev & Battacharya write “Extreme Value Theory is the
most natural framework that can provide a principled answer to the question about
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whether or not natural human lifespan is finite”. Davison, Segers, and Zhou also use
this framework, but raise a number of questions related to our analysis.
Under the heading “Uncertainty quantification”, Segers assumes that data follows
a generalized Pareto distribution and discusses the issue that from finite data one can
never be sure that a parameter of this distribution has a specific value, say 0. A general
version of this problem is that if a smaller statistical model is continuously embedded
into a larger one, then from observing a finite number of values one can never be
sure that the smaller model is the right one. An extreme and unwanted conclusion
from this argument would be that model selection, one of the most important tools
of applied statistics, is invalid and that one always should use the largest model one
could imagine. For some discussion of this issue, see Section 3.2 of our paper. We
found the philosophical arguments in Mayo and Cox (2006) helpful.
Stoev & Battacharya address the same issue as Segers from a different angle by
using “testing affinity” to quantify the statistical difficulty of the question of finite-
ness or not of the human lifespan. Their conclusion is that the amount of data so
far available may not be sufficient to give a very confident answer to the ques-
tion. Similarly, Zhou, using expected information rather than observed information
and assuming untruncated observation, notes that for the number of observations
in the IDL database, an estimate of −0.082 or lower of the shape parameter γ
has to be obtained before the null hypothesis γ = 0 can be rejected. A simi-
lar way to treat the same issue, briefly mentioned in our paper, is through power
calculations.
Zhou makes the most detailed use of extreme value theory by assuming that human
life lengths belong to the domain of attraction of an extreme value distribution with
a second order index ρ, and writes that then the optimal sample fraction, k, to use
is O(n2ρ/(2ρ−1)), where n is the total number of observations. The total number of
deaths, n, in the countries and time periods included in the IDL data is of the order
108 (so very likely the IDL data is the most extreme one any of us has seen). Solving
the equation n2ρ/(2ρ−1) = 566 one can see that as soon as the second order index
is less than −.26 then the IDL sample size is smaller than what would be optimal,
and hence that bias does not dominate. However, to use calculations like this one for
practical statistics is carrying mathematics too far, we believe. Instead second order
variation could be seen as a way to construct more general models that include the
generalized Pareto models.
Further, from our practical point of view, Zhou’s comment about the existence
of distributions which have a finite endpoint but with asymptotically exponential
threshold excesses is irrelevant. We do not try to find a γ which lives all the way out
in asymptotia, but use asymptotic reasoning to suggest suitable models for the data
which has been observed.
In conclusion, the comments about the limited statistical resolution of the IDL—
or any—data set are relevant and have to be kept in mind when using our results (as
also discussed in our paper). Similarly, one never knows if a prediction outside of the
range of the data will hit the mark. But available data does not give any reason to
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come to any other conclusion than that survival after age 110 is exponential, so that
human life is unlimited but short.
Confidence intervals and GP fitting to data covering lower ages Davison used
the IDL validation level A data (using also the parts of the US and Japan data which
were excluded in our paper) to provide profile likelihood confidence intervals for
the endpoints of the fitted GPD distributions. He obtained intervals which all contain
∞ and with relatively high lower limits, and made the remark that these intervals
probably are conservative.
Stoev & Battacharya used new statistical technology developed in their contribu-
tion to provide confidence intervals for the endpoint of the distribution of lifespans,
and only used the 100 or 200 longest lifespans. Their intervals are built on regular
variation at a finite endpoint, and are similar, but somewhat wider than Davison’s
intervals, as can be expected since they use less of the data. As far as we understand
Stoev & Battacharya did not take truncation into account. We wonder if their methods
could be modified to handle truncation.
We agree that confidence intervals are a useful way of complementing the tests
performed in our paper. We also enjoyed the Stoev & Battacharya simulation-based
heatmaps.
Davison next comments that his results disagree with those of Einmahl et al.
(2017), who use Dutch data to conclude that there is a finite limit to the human life-
span. He writes that one possible explanation is that it is unreasonable to extrapolate
from the very old persons in the Dutch data to (the even much older) supercentenar-
ians and raises the possibility that, say, a logistic force of mortality function which
first increases and then plateaus out could fit the Dutch data. Davison notes that this
plateauing in fact may also show up in the Dutch data.
We completely agree with Davison’s comments: The Dutch data is dominated by
ages around 100 where human mortality is clearly increasing, and to accommodate
this a fitted GP distribution has to have an increasing force of mortality, or equiva-
lently a finite endpoint. However, the (in fact quite surprising) fact shown by the IDL
data, that after age 110 human mortality is at a constant plateau, is then not caught
by the GP model.
Additionally, Einmahl et al. (2017) present the pooled estimates 114.1 years for
the limit of life length for men and the limit 115.7 for women, based on their Dutch
data: However, the IDL data and our GRG data together contain 7 men who lived
longer than the limit 114.1 years, and 10 women who lived longer than the limit
115.7 years, and right now (April 19, 2018) the GRG database lists 3 women who are
alive and older than 115.7 years. Jeanne Calment lived even longer than the pooled
95% upper confidence limit 120.3 for the endpoint of the lifespan for women given
in Einmahl et al. (2017), and longer than the upper endpoint of more than half of the
confidence intervals in this paper.
Davison also presents a quote from Einmahl et al. (2017) which argues for the
use of death cohorts (rather than birth cohorts) and then in a section titled “Non-
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stationarity” presents an analysis which discusses the bias arising from using death
cohorts. We again agree with Davison’s analysis.2
Truncation and censoring We appreciate the positive comments by Keiding, Davi-
son, Stoev & Battacharya, and Zhou on our efforts to incorporate the details of the
IDL sampling frame into the statistical analysis, and found Davison’s point process
based derivation of the likelihood function for truncated data instructive.
Keiding suggests that it would be possible to use the same techniques to handle
also the 2000 - mid 2003 US Data. We did not do this because the US data did not
give the exact dates of deaths, only the death year, which makes it unclear how to
handle the truncation. This was possible to do for the longer time period 1980–2000,
see discussion in our paper, but seemed problematic for a 2.5 year period. As a further
comment, the 2000 - mid 2003 data only include persons who were alive Jan 1, 2000,
and this also had to be included in the analysis, (Rootze´n and Zholud 2016), which
might make it even more fragile.
As a more general comment, taking truncation into account in the analysis often
did not change estimates much. But one cannot know if this is the case or not without
doing the correct analysis, which takes truncation into account. And, it did make a
difference for some of the analyses.
Age-biased sampling and the GRG database Zhou provides a number of examples
which illustrate how conclusions may be distorted if the sample is age-biased. A
general view of this is that, for all practical purposes, age bias can transform any
age distribution to any other age distribution with the same, or smaller, support. The
argument is as follows.
Assume that observations are i.i.d. and that the true age distribution is supported
on the entire real line, and has continuous probability density function g(x) > 0.
Further assume that the “probability” of including a life length x in the sample is
h(x). Then the density function of the observations in the sample is
e(x) = h(x)g(x)∫ ∞
0 h(y)g(y)dy
. (1)
Let f (x) be some other probability density function on the positive real line, and
assume first that there is a constant K such that sup{f (x)/g(x); 0 ≤ x} ≤ K . Then,
choosing h(x) = 1
K
f (x)
g(x)
in Eq. 1 gives that the density of the observations is f (x). If
instead sup{f (x)/g(x); 0 ≤ x} = ∞ then assume that it is possible to find an A such
that  := ∫ ∞
A
f (y)dy is arbitrarily small, and such that sup{f (x)/g(x); x ≤ A} ≤
2An “extreme” example which illustrates what could happen if one uses death cohorts is as follows:
Suppose that in a large country all men which are born in an even year are drafted into war and killed, and
that one studies life lengths of men who died at age 110 or over in some specific even year. One conclusion
would then be that male supercentenarians in this country only could live an odd number of years. This
conclusion has nothing to do with the biology of aging, it is an artefact caused by the wars. Davison refers
to a milder version of this example, the European heatwave of 2003 which killed many old persons.
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K , and set h(x) = 1
K
f (x)
g(x)
for x ≤ A and h(x) = 0 otherwise. Then Eq. (1) gives that
the density of the observed values is
e(x) =
{ 1
1− f (x), 0 ≤ x ≤ A
0, A < x,
and hence, by making  small, the distribution given by e(x) can be made to be
arbitrarily close to the distribution given by f (x). A similar argument applies if the
support of g(x) is a subset of the positive real line.
From a practical point of view, it is not likely that age-biased sampling would
change a distribution to a substantially different one. However, age-bias could easily
change an age distribution to a similar one, say, change a GP distribution to another
GP distribution with a somewhat different shape parameter.
The authors of the IDL database have made a serious effort to avoid age-bias. In
contrast, clicking on the link to “GRG World Supercentenarian Rankings List” on
GRG (2016), and scrolling to the bottom of the page one can read “To Our Readers:
Do you know of someone aged 110 or older currently living who is not on this list, but
has the documents to prove it? In this case, please contact one of our two Supercente-
narian Claims Investigators”. Thus GRG data are collected by investigating claims
sent to the GRG group. It is inconceivable that this collection method would not lead
to age-bias. Most likely it is more probable that older supercentenarians are reported.
Hence the bias goes in the opposite direction to the examples in Zhou (2018), and if
anything, would change a true γ to a smaller one.
Ferreira & Huang analysis The abstract of Ferreira and Huang (2018) says “We
verify that negative values for the extreme value index are more likely, supporting the
conclusion that models with finite endpoints seem better to fit to the human lifespan
distribution”. This conclusion is based on analyses that
1. do not take truncation into account,
2. pool the IDL and GRG databases, and
3. use yearly maxima of the data.
We think this is wrong. The reasons are as follows:
1. A main insight from the theory of statistical survival analysis is that truncation
(and censoring) has to be taken into account in analysis of survival data. This in
particular applies to the IDL and GRG databases, as discussed above (see also,
e.g., Gampe 2010).
2. Even disregarding the discussion above about age-bias of the GRG data, if two
data sets are significantly different then it is inappropriate to merge them and
consider them as i.i.d. observations of the same phenomenon. And, the IDL and
GRG data sets are very significantly different. E.g., the mean of the IDL A+B
data is 1.386 (0.067) and the mean of our version of the GRG data is 2.061
(0.111), and a standard t-test of equality of means gives the test quantity 5.20
and a p-value much smaller than 0.001.
3. Both the birth-year cohorts and the death-year cohorts analyzed by Ferreira &
Huang contain different numbers of supercentenarians for different years. It
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follows that cohort maxima for different years have different distributions: the
distribution of the maximum of a larger cohort is stochastically larger than the
maximum of a smaller cohort. Hence analyzing cohort maxima as if they are
identically distributed is wrong. This is the same mistake as made by Dong et al.
(2016).
The end of Section 2 of Ferreira and Huang (2018) contains a discussion of
whether truncation should be taken into account. We find this discussion confusing.
It concerns the rationale for the formula
f (xi)
F (e − ti ) − F(b − ti )
on p. 724 of our paper. In this expression the numerator describes the real age
distribution, which is a threshold-stable GP distribution as it should be, while the
denominator comes from the sampling frame and has nothing to do with threshold
stability or extreme value theory. Also, in reply to the penultimate sentence of Section
2 of Ferreira and Huang (2018): “model checking and optimizing estimation meth-
ods” is possible also for analyses which take truncation into account, see e.g. our
paper and Rootze´n and Zholud (2016).
Updated version of LATool Section 1 of Segers (2018) mentions a private commu-
nication about how our GUI, LATool, computed the interval (b, e) which is used to
correct the likelihood for truncation. However, what we told Segers was inaccurate.
For each country, our code computed b as the beginning of the year where the first
death occurred, and e as the end of the year with the last death. This means that our
intervals (b, e) agreed with the intervals (b, e) given in the IDL metadata, except in
three cases: the b for Spain, and the e-s for Japan and the USA. We have now writ-
ten an updated version of LATool, available in the supplementary material of this
rejoinder, which throughout uses the intervals (b, e) given in the metadata. We have
also fixed a bug in LATool and improved the estimation procedure. This has lead to
some changes of values in our paper. For completeness we have included updated
versions of these in the supplementary material. The changes have no influence on
the conclusions or discussion in our paper. However, for the new version of Fig. 5,
left panel, Keiding’s comment “the observed quantiles seem to sit rather marginally
among the simulations” no longer applies. We have also tried to make LATool more
user-friendly, and hope it will be used for alternative analyses.
A misprint Johan Segers pointed out a misprint: the paper three times says that we
have excluded persons “who died in Japan after August 31, 2003” from the analysis.
This should be “who died in Japan after September 30, 2004”.
The secret of (extremely) long life Except for Keiding, all discussants tackle the
question of whether there exists, or doesn’t exist, a finite limit to the human lifespan,
but do not write about the conclusion that there is no detectable difference between
females and males, between (groups of) countries, or between time periods. The first
question was also our motivation for starting this research: to find out if there is a hard
biological limit to the human lifespan. However, we now think the latter conclusion
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is the most interesting and intriguing one. Differences would have pointed to factors
which are important for long life, and which we could use to live longer—and this
question interests most of us. Much of supercentenarian research is driven by this
question.
A non-statistical approach to this question is taken in Jeune et al. (2010) where
the authors describe the life stories of the longest-living humans. Their conclusion
is “The life journeys of these very old people differed widely, and they are almost
without common characteristics, aside from the fact that the overwhelming majority
are women (only two are men), most smoked very little or not at all, and they had
never been obese. Still, they all seem to have been powerful personalities, but decid-
edly not all were domineering personalities. They are living examples of the fact that
it is possible to live a very long life while remaining in fairly good shape. Although
these people aged slowly, all of them nonetheless became extremely frail in their final
years.” This agrees completely with our result that none of the most obvious factors
seem to influence the chance to live very long.
There now is quite some exciting ongoing research which tries to find genetic
factors which make long life possible. And, as written by Nerman, “in the era of
quick development of organ transplantations, of stem cell therapies and of regener-
ative medicine” it seems quite possible that in the near future the human life span
will become (much) longer. However, so far presumably these efforts have not been
crowned with success—if they had we would all know about it.
So, the secret of extremely long life is still hard to find!
Electronic supplementary material Updated versions of LATool, the MATLAB toolbox for life length
analysis, and of Figure 5 and Tables 2–5 in Rootze´n and Zholud (2017).
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